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After reading Professor Ali Farazmand’s essay 
“Building Administrative Capacity in the Age of 
Rapid Globalization: A Modest Prescription for 
the Twenty-First Century,” one is reminded that 
the list of capacities we need to develop is long, the 
tasks are diverse, and the challenges are tremendous. 
By oﬀ ering a “modest” prescription, Farazmand 
departs emphatically from recent attempts to rewrite 
administrative capacity by downgrading it and 
outsourcing it to the market or 
by making it imitate corporate 
structures and techniques. Such 
exercises of yesteryear are correctly 
being excoriated now, but it 
would be well to remember that 
this failed model was inspired 
and facilitated by the stagnation 
and many perversities of the 
state-centered model that it 
replaced. As we stand at the 
cusp of a new generation of 
public administration reforms, 
we are reminded by Professor 
Farazmand’s exposition that 
we no longer have any widely 
accepted and integrative theories 
left to guide our practice of 
reform, and that a search must 
begin to look at past evidence 
with a critical eye toward 
developing practical and 
theoretical insights to advance 
the public administration agenda.
As Professor Farazmand’s article speaks for glo-bal public administration rather than the pub-lic administration of any particular country or 
any particular subﬁ eld, such as disaster management 
(though it is written for all countries and has a distinct 
discussion of crisis and emergency management), this 
short response addresses in some detail the particular 
needs of developing countries, where the vast majority 
of human beings live. Professor Farazmand correctly 
recognizes that as a prerequisite to promoting 
development -oriented governance, it is necessary to 
break the detrimental external inﬂ uence of advanced 
industrial countries and multinational corporations 
on policy choices in developing countries. Th e reform 
models that were recommended to developing coun-
tries, sometimes imposed and sometimes embraced, 
were theoretically plausible and practically appealing 
but nevertheless wrong because there could never 
have been suﬃ  cient resources 
available to back up the subtle 
yet sophisticated tasks that 
were created for the new public 
administration. In one set of 
cases, ﬁ nancial resources were 
lacking and the institutions cre-
ated to perform the regulatory 
functions of government were 
perfunctory, matching their 
objectives in form but unable 
to match them in function. In 
another set of cases, the human 
resources were lacking.
Suﬃ  ciently capable administra-
tors could not be found, espe-
cially because the general ill will 
toward and budget constraints 
on the public sector steered the 
brightest minds to the private 
sector, where they responded 
to a diﬀ erent set of incentives. 
In a third set of cases, the institutional requirements 
could not be met because social capital was elusive or 
because these institutions, burdened by their colo-
nial history and structures, responded to a new set 
of equally predatory masters rather than to citizens. 
Th ere was considerable overlap in these cases: most 
developing countries suﬀ ered from all three and other 
shortcomings, and in the absence of these resources 
and conditions, the cause–eﬀ ect chains predicted by 
the orthodox theories underlying reform could not 
occur.
As we stand at the cusp of 
a new generation of public 
administration reforms, we 
are reminded by Professor 
Farazmand’s exposition that 
we no longer have any widely 
accepted and integrative 
theories left to guide our 
practice of reform and that a 
search must begin to look at 
past evidence with a critical eye 
toward developing practical and 
theoretical insights to advance 
the public administration 
agenda.
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More importantly, theoretical biopsies also show that even in the 
presence of these resources, the cause–eﬀ ect chains would not neces-
sarily occur. Th e work of heterodox informational, institutional, 
and political theorists indicates serious ﬂ aws in the assumptions 
of these theories. Th is literature highlights theoretical ﬂ aws in the 
neoclassical economics underpinning orthodox conceptualizations, 
recommendations, and strategies for reform. It contradicts the claim 
that market-driven systems result in inevitable 
and uniquely high-level equilibria by showing 
the existence of multiple equilibria and multi-
ple channels that shift societies and reestablish 
them in diﬀ erent equilibria. Long-recognized 
development problems, such as those of 
coordination, posited by Rosenstein-Rodan 
(1951), illustrated by Hirschman (1988), and 
formalized by Stiglitz and others (see Hoﬀ  
and Stiglitz 2001), were misdiagnosed and 
underestimated by the orthodoxy. Indeed, 
phenomena critical to economic development, 
such as clustering (of industry, knowledge, 
and so forth), go against the predictions of 
neoclassical reasoning, implying that markets 
are a many-layered phenomenon, and even if 
markets are the underlying basis for a system, 
they act in concert with a number of other 
institutional factors that operate separately 
from the underlying logic of markets. Instead of acknowledging 
and coping with these issues, it was shown by pithy mathematical 
models that the market could easily solve these and other coordina-
tion problems, but none of these were backed by solid empirical 
evidence.
Another literature, through grounded empirical and political 
analysis, accuses the orthodoxy of obfuscating and obstructing 
knowledge about development paths. At the heart of these analyses 
are demonstrations showing that state-led interventions that go 
against the grain of neoclassical market analysis can be virtuous 
in shifting developing-country economies to higher growth paths. 
Amsden (1989) and Rodrik (2007) analyze examples, including 
Korea and China, of development successes that were achieved 
speciﬁ cally by heavy government manipulations in market-mediated 
exchanges, providing a wealth of knowledge about how hybrid 
forms of state–market institutional and strategic arrangements can 
serve developmental objectives. But the heterodox lessons from East 
Asia’s development success were marginalized as well as misinter-
preted by the orthodoxy, as in the case of the World Bank’s East Asia 
Miracle (1993), in which it tried to argue that market interventions 
were ultimately useless because they resulted in the same strate-
gies and allocations of resources that would have resulted had the 
“free market” been allowed to reign supreme (Amsden 1994; Kwon 
1994; Perkins 1994). Ha-Joon Chang (2002), in another heterodox 
approach, correctly points out that, in fact, what the Washington 
Consensus preached were not the strategies that Western countries 
had followed when they themselves were modernizing their econo-
mies. As the neoclassically recommended development models were 
not the ones that were practiced, their policy advice cannot claim 
to come from experience-based knowledge or claim the legitimacy 
of successful experience. In the absence of this legitimacy, it is not 
surprising that many in developing countries view Western policy 
advice as predatory and a hypocritical continuation of past exploita-
tive relationships, colonial and otherwise. It is against these hegem-
onic tendencies, backed by a narrow branch of economic theorizing, 
that the counterbalancing forces that Professor Farazmand refers to, 
when he asserts that “capitalism is not inherently evil or against the 
masses of people,” must act.
Th e damage wrought by orthodox policy 
advice was not restricted to the macroeco-
nomic policy arena. At the institutional 
level, advice that hollowed out the state was 
detrimental to developing the very capabili-
ties that Professor Farazmand identiﬁ es as 
necessary to address the challenges of public 
administration. In developing countries, the 
negative eﬀ ects of this policy advice were 
made apparent through the “orthodox para-
dox,” whereby scholars found that a strong 
state is necessary to manage its own retreat 
and to establish freer markets, which need 
more rules (Haggard and Kaufman 1992). 
Moreover, restricting the scope of  public 
administration, especially in its developmen-
tal mission, resulted in timidity in investing 
public resources—technical, managerial, and, 
especially, ﬁ nancial—to address pressing chal-
lenges. Professor Farazmand is correct in asserting that the capacity 
to manage basic challenges and provide public services has dimin-
ished considerably. If developing countries are now to reach the 
Millennium Development Goals established by the United Nations, 
it will require more aggressive and concerted public action mediated 
through democratic governance. Once we can intellectually reject 
simplistic theories, we can move more toward the critical challenge 
that Professor Farazmand alludes to, that of “managing public gov-
ernance and administration in this emerging global environment of 
rapid changes and hyper-complexities.”
In highlighting the challenges of this intellectual discourse, Professor 
Farazmand provides a useful overview of the various strands of pub-
lic administration theory and practice. But while the scope of his 
article is its strength, it is also its weakness. From the point of view 
of developing countries, where the vast majority of people live, the 
article’s approach to building a new administrative capacity does not 
resonate. Th e central question raised is whether traditional adminis-
trative capacities are good enough to meet the new challenges ahead. 
Professor Farazmand acknowledges the value of these traditional 
capacities, but claims that they “are not” and asserts that public 
administration systems must maintain a full “anticipatory” capacity 
and “stand ready” to meet unknown future challenges. But develop-
ing-country administrations are unprepared to face the challenges 
of today, let alone those of tomorrow. Th ey are ineﬃ  cient—perhaps 
not with respect to their current endowment of resources or their 
history, but certainly with respect to the demands and targets that 
we as a society have established for them.
While the problems facing public administration will undoubtedly 
become more complex, the need of the hour is more to distinguish 
routine problems that lead to crises in the everyday lives of poor 
people in developing (and often developed) countries—such as the 
Th e damage wrought by 
orthodox policy advice [in 
developing countries] was not 
restricted to the macroeconomic 
policy arena. At the institutional 
level, advice that hollowed out 
the state was detrimental to 
developing the very capabilities 
that Professor Farazmand 
has identiﬁ ed as necessary to 
address the challenges of public 
administration.
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inability to provide sanitation in India, to remedy gang violence 
in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, to control malaria in East Africa, 
and to ensure women’s rights—from unpredictable mega-events 
such as tsunamis and hurricanes. By all accounts, these daily crises 
take much more of a toll in terms of lives lost and economic costs 
incurred than terrorism or sudden natural calamities, and they do 
not resolve themselves automatically with economic growth; indeed, 
in the presence of signiﬁ cant inequalities in income and power, they 
may become even worse.
Given that it is unlikely that there will be a massive increase in 
the resources available—rich countries are not willing to substan-
tially increase their aid outlays, a situation that is made worse by 
the widespread practice of tying aid—or allocated to meet these 
challenges, the onus for improvements will rest on the creation of 
knowledge about and diﬀ usion of good public administration man-
agement and practices. Maintaining a full “anticipatory” capacity to 
“stand ready” to meet unknown future challenges cannot but absorb 
massive amounts of ﬁ nancial and human resources in maintaining 
the necessary administrative redundancy. One does not normally 
employ SWAT teams for policing the beat, and not all beat cops can 
be trained to SWAT team levels of eﬀ ectiveness. Given that devel-
oping countries cannot aﬀ ord to have both, the burning questions 
are where do we ﬁ nd the necessary resources, and how should we 
allocate them?
Th e objective before public management in developing countries, 
therefore, is to manage more, with fewer resources, but with more 
skill. Th is calls for a renewed focus on good government, as opposed 
to good governance, as the latter may be misconstrued to mean 
that alternative institutions such as nongovernmental organizations 
and  community-based organizations can supplement governments, 
when, in reality, they can only complement them, and that, too, in 
limited and selective arenas.
Because the traditional administrative capacities that Professor 
Farazmand claims will be inadequate are not explicitly deﬁ ned—he 
assumes we all know them—one must imagine that he is referring 
to the Weberian systems of bureaucratic administration in their vari-
ous forms. One can appreciate the limitations of Weberian systems 
in dealing with unexpected crises that challenge standard operating 
procedures, but in developing countries, it is the manipulation and 
subversion of standard operating procedures that are more responsi-
ble for the inability to deliver public services.
In developing countries, the origins of this manipulation lie in the 
political sphere and its interaction with public administration, but 
Professor Farazmand addresses the relationship between politics 
and administration only in passing. Indeed, some of the events 
that he cites, such as the Hurricane Katrina ﬁ asco in New Orleans, 
indicate that the problem of political manipulation of administra-
tive structures is not only a developing-country phenomenon. One 
critical area of concern is campaign ﬁ nance. Th e recent scandal in 
Brazil involving the Lula administration, the ubiquitous Caixa Dois 
of Brazilian politics, and the constant manipulation of the “transfer 
system” of bureaucratic postings in the Indian administrative system 
all originate in this sphere and have a damning impact on adminis-
trative morale and eﬀ ectiveness.
We still need to solve the twentieth-century problems of public 
administration before we can have any hope of building twenty-
ﬁ rst-century administrative systems. Solving these problems ﬁ rst 
will provide the necessary base for building the types administrative 
capacities that Professor Farazmand recommends. In the quest to 
develop the required knowledge and skills, there is no reason to as-
sume that the old models—the ones actually followed by the West, 
or even Japan and the Asian Tigers—should, or now, given irrevo-
cably changed economic structures and, perhaps more importantly, 
fears about environmental carrying capacities, can be followed. 
Similarly, organizational forms that served well in the past likely will 
not be appropriate in the future. A return to bureaucratic public 
administration that served Western countries well in administering 
their own aﬀ airs, and often those of others, may not be the solution, 
but we need to identify the target objectives of public administra-
tion reforms more realistically. For developing countries, Professor 
Farazmand’s prescription, while desirable, is anything but modest. 
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